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LEGAL CONCEPTS OF HUMAN LIFE:
THE INFANTICIDE DOCTRINES
JEFFREY A. MELDMAN*
The time is not far distant when the law will be faced with novel
questions concerning human life. Medical science is already solving
problems of artificial and transplanted organs, prolongation of the life-
span, artificial insemination, fetal surgery, hormonal control, and sus-
pended animation. As the boundaries of life are expanded by these new
scientific possibilities, legal concepts of life wil have to be capable of
resolving new and complex medically-related questions. To do this, the
law wil need, as never before, a clear understanding of the proper rela-
tionship between the medical and legal models of human life.
Several definitions of life can be found in the law. Blackstone called
life "the immediate gift of God and a right inherited by nature in every
individual,"' and more specifically, "a state in which energy of function
is ever resisting decay and dissolution. . . .,,2 For some purposes, the
law recognizes the physiological "fact" that life commences at the mo-
ment of conception, 3 but more often, the legal state of life is measured
from quickening in the womb,4 or from birth.
5
Whether or not such legal concepts of life will be sufficient in the
future is not clear. Could they be applied to a human being created
from undamaged portions of cadavres, in a Frankenstein fashion? Or
to babies developed entirely in the laboratory ?6 Or to someone "brought
back to life" after a period of death-like suspended animation ?7
The purpose of this paper is to evamine the legal field that so far
has been the most involved with legal notions of life-the law of in-
fanticide. The murder of infants on the threshold of life is one area in
which the courts already have been forced to adopt some concept of
human life. A survey of the life-doctrines developed in these cases, as
well as a brief look at certain related doctrines, may help to indicate
how well today's courts are prepared for the new biomedical problems
they must soon face.
The Early English Doctrines
The Nineteenth Century in England witnessed a series of alleged
*Member Wisconsin Bar, A.B. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965;
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1968.
'137 C.J. Life at 347 n. 5(a), citing 1 BLACKSTONE COMM. 129.2 United States v. 4 Live Silver Black Foxes, 1 F.d 933, (D.D.C. 1924), cit-
ing 1 BLACKSTONE CoMl,. 129.
3 Id. at 934.
4See, e.g., Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86 (1872), and Atkinson, Life, Birth and
Live-Birth, 20 L.Q. REv. 134, 136 (1904).
5 53 C.J.S. Life § 881 (1948).
G See, e.g., Control of Life, 59 Lrm no. 11, p. 59 (Sept. 10, 1965).
7 See, e.g., Karl Brown, The Man They Could Not Hang, Columbia Pitcures
(1939).
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infanticides committed by unwed mothers, out of fear or embarrassment,
while or immediately after giving birth to their illegitimate offspring.
Rex v. Poulton," in 1832, was one of the early such cases to come
before the Courts. Ann Poulton, the defendent therein, was accused of
killing her child by strangulation, but it was not clear from the facts
whether the child had died before or after the birth had been completed.
There was medical testimony to the effect that the child had breathed
before expiring, but the medical witnesses were unable to give opinions
as to whether the breathing took place during or after the process of
birth. The Court at Old Bailey began its summation to the jury by
holding that a conviction of homocide was not possible unless the sub-
ject of the homocide was alive, that is, unless the infant in this case had
been born alive. Being born alive, the court continued, requires "that
the whole body is brought into the world; and it is not sufficient that
the child respires in the process of the birth."9
One year later in a similar case, Rex v. Enoch,'° at the Worcester
Assizes, the court also held that a complete birth was necessary before
a child could be sufficiently alive to be the subject of a murder. It used
as the criterion of live birth the establishment of "an independent circu-
lation in the child."' 1 The following year at the Oxford Assizes, the
court in Rex v. Brain1 heard a case in which the medical' evidence
tended to prove that the decedent child had not breathed before its death.
While again requiring that the child be "wholly in the world in a living
state to be the subject of a charge of murder," the court did not con-
sider breathing to be essential, since "many children are born alive,
and yet do not breathe for some time after their birth."13
Thus far developed, the English law of infanticide required a com-
plete live birth as determined by an independent circulation, which
could not be proved or disproved merely by evidence of breathing or
not breathing. As such, the rule was rather ambiguous. It was unclear
what marked the completeness of the birth or what constituted an in-
dependent circulation.
The case that attempted to answer both of these questions' was Re-
gina v. Trilloe14 decided in 1842. The infant in that case had been
strangled by its mother after it had been fully produced from her body,
but before the umbilical cord had been severed. The court held that
such production was sufficient for a complete birth, and that medical
testimony proving that the child breathed after.having been fully pro-
s 172 Eng. Rep. 997 (1832).
9 Id. at 998.
10 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (1833).
"lIbid. Accord, Regina v. Wright, 173 Eng. Rep. 1039 (1841).
"2 172 Eng. Rep. 1272 (1834).
13 Ibid. Accord, Rex v. Sellis, 173 Eng. Rep. 370 (1837).
14 174 Eng. Rep. 674 (1842).
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duced was sufficient to establish that the, child had had an independent
circulation. 15
These four cases summarize the doctrine that developed in the first
half of the century. All,convictions for infanticide required live births,
and the supposedly medical criterion of an independent circulation was
the favorite view from about 1780 on.'6 Proof of breathing was usually
considered relevant but not conclusive in determining the question of
independent circ ulation.
However, although the doctrine was beginning to crystalize, its
vague dependence on scientific criteria made it difficult to apply. Due
to the secrecy surrounding most of these births, there were rarely wit-
nesses who could testify as to facts that could determine whether or
not the victim had established an independent circulation. Post-mortem
tests were almost always inconclusive since the legal requirements for
an independent circulation had never been spelled out.
Judges and juries often took advantage of ,these difficulties of proof,
acquitting defendents whenever possible. Even in the rare cases of
convictions, the inflexible practice soon became to reprieve any mother
who had killed her child before it had lived a full year.' 7 As a conse-
quence of the difficulty of conviction, and of the resulting leniency in
the courts, the law of infanticide became highly unpopular. An 1862
medical treatise by Dr. W. Burke Ryan criticized the necessity to prove
life as a "legal fiction" that serves merely as an obstacle to punishing
those who sacrifice infant life.h The Morning Chronicle frequently at-
tacked the legal rule as one based on sympathy rather than justice:
When a woman is arraigned for the murder of' her illegitimate
child-for to this class such offenses principally belong-a jury
is almost certain to return a verdict of not guilty. Compassion
takes the place of justice. They see before them, perhaps, a
servant girl, the victim of some well bred scamp, who has be-
trayed and deserted her. She is young, good-looking, friendless.
The traces of misery are still on her face, and there is an eloquent
counsel pleading for her who knows how to turn all the circum-
stances of her pitiable case to good account. . . . Again and again
this scene is enacted in our Courts of Law and almost invariably
with the same result-acquittal. 9
This process, continued, criticized but basically unchanged, until the
Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938 were passed. Under this legislation,
a mother who killed her child under the age of 12 months was to be
1' This ruling was anticipated several years earlier by the court in Rex v. Crutch-
ly, 173 Eng. Rep. 355 (1833).
10 Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 CAMB. L.J. 76, 79 (1944).
17Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report 57-59, Sec. 155 (1953).
I's Ryan, Infanticide: Its Law, Prevalence, Prevention and History (1862), review
in Infanticide Memorandum (author unknown) 162, newsclippings and original
manuscript (1861), only known copy: Harvard Law Library UK/983/INF.
19 Infanticide Memorandum, supra note 18, at 16, from the Morning Chronicle(London), Sept. 7, 1861. ,
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punished as if for manslaughter only, if "at the time of the act or omis-
sion [causing the death], the balance of her mind was disturbed by
reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving
birth."20 The new law was more in keeping with popular sentiment for
it provided a way to find a mother guilty of infanticide without inflicting
upon her capital punishment, which was generally thought to be too
severe.
It also avoided the legal question of life. The doctrine of live birth
became largely irrelevant, for courts now had available the compromise
charge of manslaughter for which no proof of live birth was thought to
be necessary.21
Thus, the early English attempt to form a legal meaning for life
out of supposedly medical criteria had failed and was discarded. It
failed partly because the scientific measurement needed to make the
criteria meaningful was not yet available and partly because judicial
and popular opinion was opposed to making an all-or-nothing distinction
between natal and post-natal deaths. In effect, it failed because the
proper relationship between medical knowledge and judicial opinion in
decisions of this kind had not yet been worked out.
The American Doctrines
In the United States, the law of infanticide developed in a more
complex fashion than it had in England. With more jurisdictions there
was more room for differing views on the necessity of live birth, the
relevance of breathing, and the meaning of independent circulation. As
of the end of the Nineteenth Century, there was no authoritative view
of infanticide that had been adopted by the courts.22 By the middle of
the Twentieth Century, however, a majority view and a minority view
had been established, the former requiring live birth, and the latter re-
quiring only viability of the infant.23
The majority American view was an elaborated version of the old
English doctrine. The requirement of live birth was usually said to be
based on the necessity of proving a corpus delicti, which was generally
held to be as essential in cases of homicide as in other cases. 24 Unless
the subject of the supposed homicide had been aliving person, it was
said that there logically could be no murder and therefore no mur-
derer.25 Most courts insisted upon a complete live birth to establish the
corpus delicti,26 and upon proof of independent circulation to establish
the live birth.
2
1
20 Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, sec. 1 (1).
21 Royal Commission Report on Capital Punishment, supra note 17, sec. 156.
22 Atkinson, supra note 4, at 134.
3 Ishmael, Proving Live Birth in Infanticide, 17 Wyo. L.J. 237, 242 (1963).
2441 C.J.S. Homicide § 312 (f) (1944) ; 26 AM. JUR. 376 Homicide § 326 (1940).
25 Williams v. People, 158 P.2d 447, 452 (Colo. 1945) (Hilliard, J., dissenting)
Accord, Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).26 Annot., 159 A.L.R. 523, 525 (1945).
27 2 WHARTON, EVIIENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 874, at 1510 (11th ed. 1935);
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The first important case in this line of authority was State v. Win-
throp,2 decided in 1876 in Iowa, in which a physician was charged with
murdering a child that he had attempted to deliver. The lower court
had instructed the jury that live birth was a necessary element of the
crime, but that to prove live birth, only the child's "independent life"
and not his independent circulation need be shown. The Supreme Court
of Iowa viewed this instruction as erroneous since, in its opinion, there
could be no independent life, but only the possibility of it, until inde-
pendent circulation had been established. Winthrop soon became a lead-
ing authority in infanticide cases, and it was followed widely by courts
that favored the live-birth requirement.
29
The criterion of independent circulation set out in Winthrop how-
ever, remained basically as unclear in the cases that followed as it had
been in the early English cases. As in those cases, respiration was gen-
erally considered as an indication of independent circulation, but it was
almost always held inconclusive.3° In Morgan v. State31 the post-mortem
examination of the decedent included the "hydrostatic test," in which
the decedent's lungs had been placed in water. The lungs had floated,
which is usually an indication that they contained air and that the child
had therefore breathed, but the medical experts admitted that gases of
decomposition might also cause flotation. Although the court held that
there was insufficient evidence of respiration, it went on to say, "Gen-
erally, [but not always] if respiration is established, that also establishes
an independent circulation and independent existance." 32 This was an
adoption by the courts of the usual medical practice of taking breathing
as the rough test of live birth.33 However, in Benett v. State34 when the
medical expert testified that breathing was "the most reliable indication
as to whether a baby is born alive,' 35 the court rejected such testimony
as a determinate of whether independent circulation had been established,
and it chided the expert for not being able to provide a clear medical
definition of independent circulation. In Jackson v. Commonwealth,36
the court required that both respiration and an independent existence
be proved in order to establish that a child was born alive, which made
the relationship of breathing to independent circulation even more un-
clear. The use of respiration to show independent circulation was fur-
40 C.J.S. Homicide § 2 (b) (1944).
2843 Iowa 519 (1876).
29 E.g., Shedd v. State, 178 Ga. 653, 173 S.E. 847 (1934); State v. ONeall, 79
N.C. 571, 60 S.E. 1121 (1908).
302 WHARTON, EviDEcE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 874, at 1510 (11th ed. 1935); 40
C.J.S. Homicide § 2 (b) (1944); Annot., 159 A.L.R. 523, 527 (1945).
31 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).
32 Id. 256 S.W. at 434.
33 Atkinson, supra note 4, at 145.
34 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1936).
35 Id. at 635.
36265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (C.A. 1936).
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ther complicated by the large number of still-births in which the fetus
died, just before delivery, from anoxia (lack of oxygen), which can
present some of the same symptoms as strangulation.3
Faced with the confusing methods by which some courts have tried
to incorporate medical evidence of respiration into the legal definition
of live birth, other courts turned to other criteria of independent circu-
lation. A few courts have relied heavily on the simple opinion of a
medical witness as to whether or not the child had lived. In State v.
Merrill,38 the medical expert had been asked whether in his opinion the
decedent had been alive when the strangulation took place, and he had
replied, "No one could tell that." It was held on appeal that his testimony
showed that there was insufficient evidence to establish the corpus de-
licti. The court in Montgomery v. State,39 after rejecting the evidence
of respiration, construed the expert's statement, "I could not say the
child's heart ever beat after it was separated from its mother com-
pletely," clearly to mean that the child had never been born alive. In
People v. Hayner,40 however, the court rejected the expert's opinion that
the child had been born alive, because the medical evidence was thought
to be highly ambiguous. It held that medical opinion as to live birth
under such circumstances could be only "of slight or merely conjectural
significance."' 4 1 Medical opinion sometimes was held to be of greater
significance when other evidence supported it. In People v. Ryan42 an
expert's opinion that -the infant had lived was bolstered by a witness
who testified to having heard the child cry. The expert's opinion of live
birth in Hubner v. State43 was satisfactorily supported by evidence of
air in the lungs and stomach of the child, of its dry and clean hair, and
of the discoloration of the skin of its neck where a rag had been tightly
tied.
Another alternative to the breathing test was briefly considered in
State v. Osmus. 44 The medical witness in that case, Dr. Stuckenhoff, had
testified that a physician delivering a baby usually waits until the pulsa-
tion in the umbilical cord ceases before cutting the cord. The court
decided that the ceasing of this pulsation was probably the best medical
criterion of ."independent circulation," for it marked the point in time
when the infant stopped sending its blood into the placenta for oxygena-
tion. Fortunately the court also realized the unfeasibility of adopting
this medical procedure as a legal criterion since it could be used only
3 Grove, Cawes of Death in the Peri-Natal Period, 6 J. FoRENSIC MEDIciNE 43,
51 (1959).
38 72 W.Va. 500, 78 S.E. 699 (1913).
3944 S.E.2d 242 (Ga. 1947).
40300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949).
41 Id. 300 N.Y. at 176.
429 Il1. 2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1956).
43 131 Wis. 162, Il N.W. 63 (1907).
4473 Wyo. 183, 276 P2d 469 (1954).
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when the birth was attended by a physician who was later available to
testify in court. Furthermore, as pointed out in. Wehrman v. Farmers'
and Merchants' Savings Bank of Durant,45 the ceasing of 'this pulsation
may also be caused by a mere reduction of placental oxygenation, or by
the death of the infant, and in the latter case, the court might mistak-
enly take the child's death as an indicator of "independent circulation,"
and therefore of life. Severance of the umbilical cord itself was generally
not considered necessary for independent circulation.48
Thus; the rule fequiring live birth had been more elaborately de-
veloped in America, but it was not significantly clearer or easier to
apply than the older English rule. It still suffered from a vagueness in
its use of scientific knowledge and from a failure to separate the medical
questions from the legal ones.
Partly, perhaps, in reaction to this vagueness, and paralleling the
legislative concern in England, a minority of American courts stopped
requiring a showing of live birth in infanticide convictions. Leading these
cases was People v. Chavez,4 7 decided in California in 1947. The Chavez
court completely rejected the well precedented requirements of live birth
and held that a child is alive for purposes of the law of infanticide when
it becomes viable, that is, when it is able'to live independently of the
mother if removed from her body. The court explained:
There is no sound reason why an infant should not be consid-
ered a human being when born or removed fromthe body of its
mother, when it has reached that stage of development where it is
capable of living an independent life as a separate being, and
where in the natural course of events it will so live if given normal
and reasonable care. It should equally be'held that a viable child
in the process of being born is a human being, within the meaning
of the homicide statutes, whether or not the process has been
fully completed..4 ,
The court was particularly critical of the legal adoption of any
medical criterion of the "moment of birth." It insisted that there was
no substantial difference between a, viable, pre-natal infant and a newly
born infant, and that any legal distinction would be artificial. A few
courts that had been troubled by the live-birth rule were quick to follow
Chavez, for the viability rule made much of the highly technical and
often speculative testimony of medical experts no longer necessary. 49
Some courts, while not clearly following Chavez, relied on it in making
strong assumptions of live birth.50
45221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564, 569 (1935).
402 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 874, at 1511 (llht ed. 1935);
Annot., 159 A.L.R. 523, 528 (1945).
47176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
-4 Id. at 94.
40 E.g., Singleton v. State, 35 So. 2d 375 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948).
so State v. Shephard, 255 Iowa 1218, 124 N.W.2d 712 (1964):
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Of course the Chavez rule was not entirely free from ambiguity.
Although the age of viability is generally taken to be approximately
seven months, 50 there is no way to be sure of viability in any particular
case, 2 and many fetuses only twenty-four weeks old have been able to
survive with intensive care. 53 At the present time, it is true that the
question of whether or not a child was viable is less likely to arise than
the question of live birth, but this may change in the near future as the
use of incubators and artificial wombs grows. When that happens, the
minority of courts that follow the Chavez rule will once again be faced
with the problem of integrating medical knowledge and judicial decision,
a problem that they will have succeeded in avoiding only temporarily.
Related Doctrines of Life
Although the law of infanticide has delved the deepest into the legal
question of human life, several other fields of law have had to face a
similar problem when elements of their legal doctrine were affected by
the life status of the parties. It will be helpful to briefly examine a few
of these fields here.
One such field closely related to that of infanticide is the law of
torts against unborn children. The basic question to be answered is
whether or not an unborn fetus can recover for injuries to himself oc-
curing during his mother's pregnancy. At common law an unborn infant
rarely had the right to sue for such injuries. For example, in Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital,54 the court held that an unborn infant had no dis-
tinct and independent existence, in contemplation of the common law.55
Mr. Justice Boggs dissented in this opinion, arguing that once a fetus
is viable, he is no longer part of the mother's life5 6 but the courts in-
variably followed the majority view. Recoveries were possible, however,
when statutes had been passed to allow suits for pre-natal injury.5 7 In
Scott v. Peterson,58 the court defended such statutes, arguing that the
statutory existance granted to an unborn child was "an established and
recognized fact by science and by everyone of understanding." Such
statutes were passed in a majority of the states and they often were not
limited to post-viability injuries.59
51 West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1958) ; Chapman, Wrongful
Death of Stillborn Viable Fetus, 9 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 25, 1965 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE ANNUAL 283, 294.52 Atkinson, supra note 4, at 136.
53 Control of Life, supra note 6, at 60.
54 184 II1. 359, 56 N.E. 63& (1900).
55Accord. Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). See also, Reed, Pre-
Natal Injuries: Development of the Right of Recovery, 10 DEFENSE L.J. 29
(1961).
56 56 N.E. at 641.
57 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
58 Id.
59 Byrne, The Legal Rights of the Unborn Child, 41 Los Angeles B. Bull. 24, 68(1965). See also Yearick, The Viable Child, 1949 INS. L.J. 885.
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A criterion for determing the starting point of human life can also
be crucial in cases involving wills and estates whenever a death and
birth occur so close in time that the question of whether one party sur-
vived the other is unclear. One of the most intriguing of such cases is
Wehrman v .Farmers' and Merchants' Savings Bank of Durrant.60 The
factual question to be determined in that case was whether either of
two newly born children "survived" his mother, who had died in the
same operation that resulted in delivery of the twins. The mother had
been given a spinal anesthetic preliminary to a necessary Caesarian sec-
tion, but about eight minutes after receiving it-and before any incision
had been made-she stopped breathing. Attempts at resucitation failed
and she was pronounced dead seven minutes later. The physicians then
performed the section and were able to deliver both children, although
neither infant showed any signs of respiration. Attempts to begin respira-
tion in the infants also failed, and they were pronounced dead after thirty
minutes. After hearing expert testimony that a newborn child can live
(his heart can beat) for several minutes without respiring, due to the
high oxygen content in his blood cells, and after noting that no attempt
to find a heartbeat had been made, the court concluded that the children
would be presumed to have lived long enough to survive their mother,
absent evidence by the plaintiff that they bad died earlier.61
The legal concept of life can also become relevant at the other end
of the life-span, when questions arise as to when life ends and death
begins. In the law of homicide the courts are unanimous that a human
being with any life left whatever, "even the last spark," is a proper sub-
ject for homicide.62 This is true even if the victim had been suffering
from an incurable diseaseO had been under a sentence of execution, 64
or had been already dying at the time,65 as long as the defendent's act
accelerated the death.66 Thus, in State v. BeBee,67 the defendent was
convicted of murder when he fired a bullet into an officer already dying
from a previous bullet wound. The medical expert testified that either
shot alone would have been fatal, and the court did not even require
evidence of how the second shot contributed to the death. On the other
hand, once a person is dead, he is no longer a human being in the eyes
of the law, and he can no longer be the subject of a homicide.6 s For-
tunately, the problem of determining legally the exact criterion of death
is rarely in issue, and there has been very little legal discussion of the
complex medical indications of death. But the near future may bring
60221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935).
61 Id. 259 N.W. at 570.
621 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 190, at 436 (1957).
634 0 C.J.S. Homicide § 2 (a) (1944).
6426 AM. JUR. Homicide § 33 (1940).
65 People v. Cione, 293 Ill. 321, 127 N.E. 646 (1920).6 WHARTON, mpra note 62, § 190, at 435.
67 113 Utah 398, 195 P.2d 746 (1948).
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important advances in artificial life prolongation and suspended anima-
tion devices, and with them new problems of the meaning of, death. Is
a man dead when he functions only because he is connected to a heart-
lung machine? Is he dead if there is a 90 percent chance that he can
be brought out of a death-like state of suspended animation? Or a 50
percent chance? Or a 10 percent chance?
One medical field that is already beginning to question the court's
simple notion of death is that of euthanasia, sometimes called "mercy
killing." Euthanasia traditionally has been viewed by the courts as the
killing of a living human being, motivated by an intention to 'end the
victim's incurable suffering from a painful and fatal disease.69 As such
it is repeatedly held to be homicide, for the law of homicide recognizes
no defense based on motivation or good intentions.7 0 In actual practice,
defendents are treated leniently by the courts 71 and often are not prose-
cuted at all.7 2 However, it has been suggested that a person whose only
existance is perpetual pain might be viewed as no longer alive for legal
purposes, even though he may still display many of the medical indica-
tions of life. Horace M. Kallen holds this view, maintaining that "hu-
man existance is consciousness. . . .The human person ceases when
awareness goes out and unawareness goes out when it becomes intoler-
able to itself."7 3 This approach may seem too foreign to fit into current
legal doctrines, but future questions about the boundaries of human life
may well require consideration of views like this, and a clear under-
standing of the separate roles of medical and legal concepts will be
essential.
Conclusion
The development of the doctrine of infanticide, and of the related
doctrines that have been examined, unfortunately displays a tendency
that may hamper the legal resolution of biomedical questions of the
future. It is a tendency to confuse the available scientific knowledge
with the legal, doctrine to be formulated by the court.
The old infanticide doctrine of England, and the majority rule in
America are both examples' of this confusion. The courts in these cases
discuss the legal requirement of "life" for'a "homicide charge in the
same breath with the supposedly medical requirement of "independent
circulation" for a live birth. In so doing, the courts manifest a lack of
understanding of the different fundamental natures of medicine and of
law. Medical science is an attempt at describing as conceptually as pos-
sible the biological aspects of nature, in order to improve efforts at
6840 C.J.S. Homicide § 2(a) (1944).
62 See, e.g., Note, 48 MICH. "L. REv. 1199 (1950).
7026 AM. JUR. Homicide § 104 (1940).
71 ST. JoHN-STEVAs, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW 263 (1961).
7248 MIcH. L. REv. 1199, 120a (1950).
.3 Kallen, An Ethics of Freedom: a Philosophers View, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165,
1168 (1956).
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combating disease and saving human life. Medical terminology merely
provides a system of somewhat arbitrary labels that facilitate the com-
munication of these descriptions and concepts. The law, on the other
hand, is an attempt to prescribe- and control the conduct of men accord-
ing to continually evolving principles of judicial evaluation.
Medical science is interested in learning how to increase the number
of live-births, not in deciding the legal meaning of the term. That is a
question for the law. It is no wonder that the medical expert in the
Benett case, when asked if the decedent child had establish~a an inde-
pendent circulatory system, replied: "What do you mean by independent
circulatory system?"7
Medical science can not be asked to make legal decisions. It can,
however, be asked to describe and explain what is currently known of
the phenomena about which the court must decide. In this role, medical
knowledge can be of great use to the courts. New developments in post-
mortem enzyme analysis, for example, may soon make it possible to
pinpoint every detailed biological fact surrounding a 1eri-natal death,"5
but once these facts are explained to the courts, only the courts them-
selves will be able to attach legal significance to them. Medical science
can help the court to better understand the problems ,before it, but it
can not make the moral, evaluatory, and judicial opinions that comprise
the law.
A few courts have seen this distinction. Fifty years ago, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court realized that "the medical or scientific recognition
of the separate entity of an unborn child [does not] aid in determing
its legal rights."7 But for the most part, the infanticide 'doctrine has
evolved as a confused mixture of medical knowledge and legal judg-
ment.
The English infanticide legislation and the Chavez rule in America
resulted partly in response to this confusion. Their approach was to
avoid the medical-legal interaction altogether, by establishing doctrines
that could ignore whatever medical knowledge might be available. This
may be a -workable solution for the time being, but future problems of
biological life, will not be so easy to by-pass. Some of the auxiliary doc-
trines mentioned in this paper, such as the timing of birth in "survival"
disputes and the determination of "finar' death, already ,require a clear
understanding of the relationship of medicine to law. Only when the
courts start to comprehend the proper role of scientific knowledge in
legal problems of this nature will they be ready to deal intelligently
with the biomedically advanced world of the future.
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